Chinese lending update --- Is the peak in?

It's been a while since I last updated you on Chinese loan growth.  Some of that was due to the problems of getting the data out of China. I was finally able to extract the data and it appears the peak in lending is finally in.  March data comes out soon but considering the difficulties of updating this data I thought I'd get you up to date now.

Even with the 'record' lending in the first two months of 2010 both the trailing twelve month total of lending and year over year percent change of total loans outstanding have peaked.

As with every massive increase in lending it ends up on all sorts of places and turns out to be much more prevalent than commonly thought.  Elite Chinese Politics blog (Mr. Victor Shih) has some serious allegations of hidden debt in the local government investment entities that are the analog of the Special Investment Vehicles (SIV's) of our banking bust.  Here's some more reading on the matter at businessinder.com and here.  Of course this is difficult to 'prove' as the Chinese accounting books are not the most transparent but Mr. Shih's work should not be discounted out of hand.  I suggest you go to his blog and read the comments and rebuttals.  It's good stuff. . .

Home loan delinquencies keep rising

From Calculatedrisk  Home loan delinquency rates keep going up.   As I have mentioned before this may be one reason consumer spending keeps slowly rising as people are just not paying their home loans. . .  

All these late paying homes represent a serious overhang of 'shadow' inventory hinted at by several blogs and news outlets. As you can see some portions of the 'shadow' can be quantified.  When this data series finally starts falling we'll hopefully start to see an end of the inventory overhang .  I'm not holding my breath.

Running into the Great Firewall of China

I access data from public Chinese webservers for some of the data I present on this blog.  During the start of the Google/China controversy I began to notice some odd 'errors' as I attempted to access Chinese web servers.  Sometimes I get a simple 'hello!' from the server and nothing else, other times I get a 404 error and other times there is no problem.  

I wonder if the 'Great Firewall of China' as described by the WSJ is working on keeping away the outsiders as well? 

China generally doesn't tell its people when it is interfering with their Web access, unlike some other countries, such as Saudi Arabia, that give explanatory warning messages when users are denied access to forbidden sites.

Instead, China's filtering can look to users like a technical glitch—an error message in a user's browser that makes it seem like his connection to the Internet malfunctioned. Authorities don't discuss the methods or tools they use.

Anyone else running into the same issues? 
Here's one test I just ran:
http://www.pbc.gov.cn/  -- Returns 'hello'
 
http://www.pbc.gov.cn/english/ -- Gives me a 404 error (page not found)
 
Both of those sites have worked on and off for a week or so. If you do a Google search for "people's bank of china" these are the first links you get and the Chinese central bank is not an obscure web site I'm hitting.  There's others web sites that return the same errors... puzzling . . . .

[edit 04/05/10 11:20am pst: I was able to access the above web sites on Saturday and pull the data I was looking for.  Today, Monday, I was unable to do so and received the same error messages.  I'm going to get a packet sniffer and see if the error message / 'hello' comes from the same location as the normal data and see if the Great Fire Wall is somehow blocking me ]

Will HELOC's toast the banks?

Ouch... I read this several days ago and after turning it over in my head it jived with my previous tinfoil allegation the banks are managing their losses over time  . . .

From Creditwritedowns:

About a month ago I wrote a post called “The coming wave of second mortgage writedowns” the gist of which was that the big four banks (Citi, JP, BofA, and Wells) had a shed load of exposure to now worthless second mortgages. With many first mortgages now hopelessly underwater, it stands to reason that second mortgages on those same properties have zero value. . . .

So the original loss from second-liens, as reported by the stress tests, was $68.4 billion for the four largest banks. If you look at those numbers again, and assume a loss of 40% to 60%, numbers that are not absurd by any means, you suddenly are talking a loss of between $190 billion and $285 billion. Which means if the stress tests were done with terrible 2nd lien performance in mind, there would have been an extra $150 billion dollar hole in the balance sheet of the four largest banks. Major action would have been taken against the four largest banks if this was the case.

Please go over and read the whole thing. I stopped following the bank several quarters ago. Any additional facts on this possibility would be appreciated.

This would explain the banks' dragging their feet foreclosing properties.  Not only would they have to mark down their first mortgage but the 2nd lein would be marked to zero instead of the 15-20% loss as described in the 'Stress Tests' of early last year.

A clever etf tool with a reverse stock lookup feature.

http://www.xtf.com/ has a great feature on their web site I have been looking for -- reverse stock lookup. You can type in a stock symbol and find what etf's hold that company. Sort by size and you can instantly find sector etfs.  This is a great way to find similiar stock or etfs.

http://www.xtf.com/

The reverse stock / etf lookup feature is free after signup.  Give it a try!

Inventory / Sales ratio back to "Normal"

Inventory / Sales ratio data is pretty much back to normal, as I mentioned in the last update of this data series.  The ratio ticked down a little.  Not much to see here, move along. . . .

Inflation expectations and the Treasury market

Here's your TIP / Treasury market update.  Nothing extraordinary has happened in the Treasury / TIP market in the last few months.  As mentioned in my last entry the easy money has been made and now it is a lot harder (Tips v. nominals)

One item of note is the real TIPS yield is still relatively low as compared to the history of this data series with the last entry being a 1.42% real yield.  Not very exciting, eh?  The 10 year breakeven inflation rate is effectively where it was two years ago before the Financial panic hit (2.27%)