Economics for the post MTV Generation -- It's the debt stupid

I previously mentioned an entertaining video regarding the competing economic theories of Keynes and Hayek.  Here is round two, and while its a few months old it deserves attention.

When watching the video pay close attention to the assistants to each boxer, you may recognize some other names as well as what appears to be Chairman Ben Bernanke in the first row of the meeting.





While the debate over monetary and fiscal stimulus continues (most recently as the wrangling over the federal debt limit) I'd like to repeat a graph I've shown before.

Total US debt (private, corp, government) to GDP rose for this entire data series until the great financial crisis of 2008.  Since then its been dropping and this is one reason our recovery has felt so sluggish as corporations and individuals continue to delever.

I have mentioned before how even with a very steep yield curve we are not seeing a rebounding economy and others have noticed this as well; the steep yield curve mechanism appears broken.

From Bonddad:

for virtually the entire period beginning in late 1929 and continuing right through the Great Depression and into the 1950s, the yield curve was resolutely positive. And yet that period coincided with the two worst downturns in the last 100 years, as well as three other recessions.

Until the private sector deleverages monetary policy levers will be less effective. I have suspicions as to how Mr. Bernanke will 'fix' this problem but I'll leave that to a later post with evidence.

So what explains the current crisis and malaise? I think Steve Keen is on to something.  I strongly suggest you watch this video and examine his theories.

edit: sorry about the autoplay. Hit the pause button to stop it.



http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/2010/01/steve-keen-on-the-modern-economy-and-the-outlook/
http://www.debtdeflation.com/blogs/2010/07/07/naked-capitalism-and-my-scary-minsky-model/
http://www.debtdeflation.com/blogs/2009/12/01/debtwatch-no-41-december-2009-4-years-of-calling-the-gfc/

Linkage roundup

Some stuff I've been reading:

Saudi's ready to pump more oil after OPEC disagreements.  Could get interesting if Saudi Arabia decides to burn the other OPEC nations and pump all out.  They have done this before to let everyone know who's boss.
If you are looking for a good historical book regarding oil and politics I'd suggest
The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money & Power

Central banks are culpable for cycle of boom / bust --  I have been meaning to write a longish entry regarding how specifically emerging market central banks have contributed to the cycle of boom and bust but this will have to do until then

US structural problems remain -- We are not out of the woods. It is going to take a while.

One reason for high yield falloff ? -- The Fed is selling into an illiquid market it appears, driving down prices.

I know, cheery stuff! Here's some good news:
Industrial jobs coming back to America? -- China's inflation and a declining dollar may help induce an improvement in domestic production. This macro idea has been something I've been considering for a while.

The flogging will continue until morale improves

The Federal Reserve recently announced they will purchase another 600 Billion in US Treasury bonds (commonly called Quantitative Easing 2 or QE2)  I am working on a longer email regarding how our current financial situation is very different from previous recessions and recoveries but the Federal Reserve's QE 2 announcement deserved some commentary. 

The markets did not really respond until after reading Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke's article in the Washington Post on November 4:

For example, lower mortgage rates will make housing more affordable and allow more homeowners to refinance. Lower corporate bond rates will encourage investment. And higher stock prices will boost consumer wealth and help increase confidence, which can also spur spending.

In short Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke wants higher stock prices so you'll feel better about yourself and go buy more stuff.  
Will it work?  
I have my serious doubts (as I'll expand upon in later emails).   The banks already have so much unused money they deposit the excess at the Federal Reserve. (973 billion as of October 10)  How is another 600 billion going to change the situation? 

So why is the Fed printing? Because they can and they feel like they can't do anything else. It looks like an easy painless solution but in the long term it will not fix the problem of too much debt in America. 

The problem with QE2 is the money being created is not going where Mr. Bernanke would like it to, the real US economy.  If you look at the market's reaction before and after the announcement one sees the money shifting into commodities and emerging economies while simultaneously weakening the US dollar.   The Fed is taking the easy way out by attempting to prop up and paper over our structural problems.

Lest you think this is merely the ranting of a crazed financial advisor former Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker stated the QE2 plan won't help much as well: (Yahoo, November 5, 2010)

Volcker told a business audience in Seoul that the Fed's bond plan is obviously an attempt to spur the U.S. economy but "is not the kind of action that's likely to change the general picture that I've described as slow and labored recovery over a period of time."

The Wall Street Journal (November 4, 2010) expresses caution as well:

The Fed is essentially lending enough money to the government to fund its operations for several months, something called "monetizing the debt."

In normal times, this is one of the great taboos of central banking because it is seen as a step toward spiraling inflation and because it risks encouraging reckless government spending.

Financial markets Thursday responded warmly to the Fed move, but outspoken critics of the policy issued full-throated critiques.

"It is doubtful the Fed decision will produce any results," Brazilian Finance Minister Guido Mantega told reporters following a cabinet meeting with Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva. Officials in Brazil, which averaged 850% annual inflation in the 1990s, have been critical of the Fed's easy-money policies because they are spurring price pressures abroad and could encourage new asset bubbles outside the U.S.

If all else fails, keep doing what you did before seems to be the rule at the Federal Reserve.  By his actions Ben Bernanke is attempting to artificially raise asset prices and reduce the value of the dollar.  We shall see if he is sucessful, but what happens when the crutch of QE money is removed? 

Hugh Hendry Watch -- October 28 on BBC

Hedge fund manager Hugh Hendry was recently on the BBC.  While his comments are directed towards the British economic situation they are very relevant to the situation in America.  Watch the entire clip.




Youtube link

ht InfectiousGreed

A word about the change in Fed policy today

Today the Federal Reserve altered their policy regarding principal payments on their Mortgage Backed Security holdings.

From the press release:

To help support the economic recovery in a context of price stability, the Committee will keep constant the Federal Reserve's holdings of securities at their current level by reinvesting principal payments from agency debt and agency mortgage-backed securities in longer-term Treasury securities. The Committee will continue to roll over the Federal Reserve's holdings of Treasury securities as they mature.

The stock market immediately moved upwards from the news, reducing the losses for the day.  The ten year treasury bond shot upwards in value.

A few comments regarding the change in policy:

Before the announcement the Fed intended allowing MBS principal paydowns to slowly reduce the Fed's balance sheet over time which would have reduced the quantity of narrow money in the economy.  With this news the the Fed's balance sheet will remain the same size (for now) but the composition will change from GSE backed assets to Treasury bonds and bills.

If the Fed had allowed the MBS paydowns to shrink their balance sheet the narrow and broader money supplies would have shrunk as well.  As you can see from this chart the M2 gauge of money supply has been very sluggish of late and shrinking the Fed balance sheet at this time would have slowed M2 growth even further.

This measure is not stimulative, no more money is going to be injected into the system.

If the economy was on the mend why did the Fed alter their strategy of slowly removing this stimulus?

Review and backstory of the book "This Time is Different" by NYT

I have previously brought up the book 'This Time is Different" and how the history of sovereign defaults is very instructive considering our current situation in history.  The New York Times recently had a long review of the book and the authors. They started working on the book in 2003 and it was published last September.  Great timing!

Some great quotes :

Their handiwork is contained in their recent best seller, “This Time Is Different,” a quantitative reconstruction of hundreds of historical episodes in which perfectly smart people made perfectly disastrous decisions. It is a panoramic opus, both geographically and temporally, covering crises from 66 countries over the last 800 years. “
There is so much inbredness in this profession,” says Ms. Reinhart. “They all read the same sources. They all use the same data sets. They all talk to the same people. There is endless extrapolation on extrapolation on extrapolation, and for years that is what has been rewarded.”

One interesting point in the book and the article is how often we forget the past with respect to country defaults:

Mr. Rogoff says a senior official in the Japanese finance ministry was offended at the suggestion in “This Time Is Different” that Japan had once defaulted on its debt and sent him an angry letter demanding a retraction.

Mr. Rogoff sent him a 1942 front-page article in The Times documenting the forgotten default. “Thank you,” the official wrote in apology, “for teaching the Japanese something about our own country.”

If you are at all interested in finding a great historical context for what is going on right now throughout the world I strongly suggest you read the book.

Hugh Hendry takes on . . . . Everyone

Mr. Hugh Hendry is always fun to watch and even more so in this interview:





He discusses the euro, china, George Soros and the 'axis of financial evil'. 

ht: Zerohedge

Is a steep yield curve leading us astray?

Does a steep yield curve guarantee future economic growth?  Usually but maybe not this time.

A recent article on BusinessInsider got me thinking about the yield curve and its power to predict when a recession is NOT likely. 

The article title and copy was interesting:  Unless 'This Time It's Different', There's Now Zero Chance Of A U.S. Double Dip

Substantial research suggests that the difference between interest rates for 10-year and 3-month U.S. treasuries is a reliable leading indicator for the U.S. economy, so much so that the New York Federal Reserve even creates charts using this metric, boldly titled "Probability of a U.S. Recession".
Let's hope the science holds, since according to the New York Fed's latest chart there's almost zero chance of a U.S. recession now. In April, the treasury-spread-based probability of recession collapsed to 0.04%.
We're not going to claim we're completely sold on this metric, but have to concede that historically it has worked and it's also hard to imagine why the U.S. would fall back into recession in the near-term given the rebound already in place. Things would have to start deteriorating first, and we haven't seen that yet. Should this time be different? That's not a rhetorical question. You can read the New York Fed's justification for this metric here and decide for yourself.

Here's the chart produced by the NY Fed as of June 21, 2010 which BusinessInsider refers to. As you can see it is saying there's effectively NO chance of a recession anytime soon. 

This relationship is considered so solid the yield curve is part of the leading economic indicators published by the Conference Board where the yield curve is 10% of the LEI index.

Even Krugman of the NYT has commented on how a steep curve implies positive future growth.

Now, this spread could be fairly small if people expected the economy to remain in the dumps for a long time; see Japan. What the large spread now tells us is that the US economy is in the dumps now, but that investors see a reasonably good chance of a strong recovery in the not-too-distant future. That’s good news, not bad news.

Both the Fed and Pimco have web sections devoted to discussing the yield curve and its predictive powers.

Substantial research from the Federal Reserve on the yield curve shows it is a good predictor of future economic growth.
From Federal Reserve: July/August 2006 - Current Issues:

Conceptual Considerations
The literature on the use of the yield curve to predict recessions has been predominantly empirical, documenting correlations rather than building theories to explain such correlations. This focus on the empirical may have created the unfortunate impression that no good explanation for the relationship exists—in other words, that the relationship is a fluke. In fact, there is no shortage of reasonable explanations, many of which date back to the early literature on this topic and have now been extended in various directions. For the most part, these explanations are mutually compatible and, viewed in their totality, suggest that the relationships between the yield curve and recessions are likely to be very robust indeed. We give two examples that emphasize monetary policy and investor expectations, respectively. . . .

Here's the important part . . .

A rise in short-term interest rates induced by monetary policy could be expected to lead to a future slowdown in real economic activity and demand for credit, putting downward pressure on future real interest rates.

So an inverted yield curve chokes lending which then slows economic growth.  Conversly a steep yield curve induces lending which stimulates economic growth.  Lets look at some data provided by the Federal Reserve from 1974 onward comparing yield curves and recessions.  As you can see there is a strong relationship between the two. In all cases an inverted curve preceeded or coincided with recessions as shown by the gray recession bars. Furthermore no recessions occurred without a yield curve inversion (or nearly so) happening beforehand.  Also note how steep the yield curve is now as compared to recent history.  Rarely has the curve exceed 4%

It's no wonder the steep yield curve is considered such a reliable indicator.

Let's take it one step further and look at the relationship between a steep yield curve and economic activity through the mechanism of lending growth. This graphic adds bank loans and leases at commercial banks.  Looking at the graphs you can see in each case an inverted yield curve resulted in a recession and a slowdown in lending.  Once the yield curve returned to 'normal' with higher long term rates bank lending resumed growing and the country exited a recession  . . . except this time. Bank lending continues to decline which is exceptional.  (Before you get excited about what appears to be a sudden spike in the rate of lending you should know that is due to off balance sheet lending vehicles being brought back onto bank balance sheets.  Annaly's blog has the details.) 

Annaly's recent blog post on debt and GDP growth reinforces the previous picture.  Real credit market growth is strongly linked to real GDP growth. 

My contention is the steep yield curve is no longer an accurate predictor of future economic growth due to the lack of credit growth.

Has there been another time when a steep yield curve has led us astray?  Yes.  Robert Shiller provides some excellent long term historical data going back to the 19th century.  Let us examine some data from 1928 through World War II. While the data fields are not precisely similar they are close enough to provide analogs to modern data sets on this topic. 

Here the difference between 1year and 10 year rates is shown as compared to real earnings on the Standard and Poors equity index. 

While this does not show lending activity it does show what one would hope results from increased lending namely earnings growth.

Some interesting relationships can be observed:

The yield curve was very inverted in 1929 and returned to a 'normal' curve in 1930. Earnings did rebound from their lows but did not exceed their 1929 peak until after World War II.

More importantly a serious fall in earnings in 1937 coincided with a non-inverted yield curve.

The rarely mentioned mechanism (credit growth) between a steep yield curve and economic growth is not working.  It is my contention until credit growth at least stops falling the steep yield curve rule of thumb should be ignored and one should be concerned with very tepid (if at all) real GDP growth.

If my thesis is correct and this rule is broken it could come to quite a shock to those who consider it dogma. Considering the yield curve is part of the Leading Economic Indicators from the Conference Board it may well be used by many in portfolio allocation decisions.   If you hear in the future how the steep yield curve is showing how we can't go into a recession remember the yield curve alone does not create economic growth but creates the opportunity for increased credit growth which then causes economic growth.

This Time It's Different.

Sources:

Federal Reserve FRED data
Federal Reserve section on steep yield curve

Robert Shiller

edit 01/28/11: As has been pointed out to me in other conversations Japan has had a few recessions over the last 15-20 years while their yield curve has not been inverted.

Another short term money market indicator

I recently posted about the TED spread and how it had been marching higher (Murphy's law struck of course and it promptly reversed course right after I mentioned it.)

Zerohedge recently posted about a similiar money market stress indicator in the Chinese banking sector that bears watching.  If you want to look at the 1 month Chinese interbank lending rate in there future, here's the direct Bloomberg link

Just one reason I'm staying out of the equity playground right now.

The equity markets are always inundated with economic news and indicators.  One of those indicators that 'doesn't really matter until it does' is the TED (Treasury / EuroDollar) spread or the difference between short term US Treasury rates (Treasury) and short term dollar denominated debt in Europe (Eurodollar)  It is a good indicatior of distress in the short term money markets and before the crisis of fall 2008 the TED spread was flashing a warning signal. 

As you can see from the chart above the TED spread has started to turn upwards after spending all of 2009 in a steady decline.  You can play with the graph at stockcharts.com if you want to zoom in or change the indicators.  While the TED spread is currently below the elevated levels of early 2008 it has been consistently rising since late April 2010.    This rise also lends credence to the feeling many have (including myself) that this correction is different than all the others we've had since the March 2009 lows.

Until the TED spread takes a rest from its ascent I'll most likely be watching the stock market from the sidelines.

edit: stockcharts.com does not show the TED spread in real time. You can watch it real time here:  http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/quote?ticker=.TED%3AIND

Some video of Marc Faber

Here's two somewhat lengthy videos of Marc Faber.  I suggest you watch both and see what one man thinks about the past and future.  While I think it likely his prediction central banks will keep printing it is not assured. 

The second video is a debate between him and Arthur Kroeber of Gavekal Dragonomics regarding the 'bubble' in China.  One item to note is how many people in the room think China will overheat. 




Reuters link for debate

ht: Wildebeests
ht: Business Insider

Keynesians start to discover the power of excessive debt

Just a little clip from one of my favorite sci fi movies The Fifth Element.  Replace the unknown evil sphere with excessive debt.




Greece, Hungary, California, New York, etc.  I wonder who is next to realize what happens when you borrow too much money.  China perhaps?

"Fear the Boom and Bust" a Hayek vs. Keynes Rap Anthem -- Economists in a modern world

This has been making the rounds and is actually pretty funny... :)




Hippity Hop and Economics; you see them together all the time, right? :)

ht: zerohedge